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The Panofsky-Newman Controversy 
Iconography and Iconology Put to the Test of “Abstract” Art 
Pietro Conte 
Princeton, February 1961. Among the numerous letters and envelopes which fill his desk 
daily, the almost seventy-year-old Erwin Panofsky notices the latest issue of ARTNEWS, a 
journal founded in 1902 that quickly became one of the most prestigious observatories 
and mouthpieces of contemporary art scene. He leafs through the pages inattentively, 
until he finds an enthusiastic review of his book, Renaissance and Renascences in West-
ern Art, penned by the art critic George Kubler (Kubler [1961]). Curious, he begins read-
ing. He discovers that, instead of being the rather usual homage to an undisputed aucto-
ritas, this brief essay represents an attempt to reconsider and reshape some fundamen-
tal concepts of his work by applying them to 1940s and 1950s American art. Kubler takes 
cue, in particular, from the famous law of disjunction between forms and meanings that, 
according to Panofsky, distinguished the medieval renascences with respect to the Re-
naissance proper, on the basis of the principle that «wherever a sculptor or painter bor-
rows a figure or a group from a classical work of art he almost invariably invests it with a 
non-classical, viz., Christian, meaning; conversely, wherever he borrows a theme from 
classical poetry, mythology, or history he almost invariably presents it in a non-classical, 
viz., contemporary form» (Panofsky [1960]: 25). 
However, the reviewer replaces this original formulation of the «disjunction» con-
cept – though it cannot be understood whether or not he fully realizes the theoretical 
shift with respect to Panofsky’s initial idea – with a different one, believed to be typical 
of contemporary American art and based on the assumption of such a conspicuous 
break with traditional (i.e. European) forms that it could also bring about, at least poten-
tially, a rift on the meanings to which those same forms gave shape. If Panofsky’s princi-
ple of «disjunction» entails the persistence of a certain form to express a different 
meaning or, vice-versa, the persistence of a certain meaning expressed in different 
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forms, Kubler argues instead that the dissolution of the traditional formal values enact-
ed by so-called Abstract Expressionism may lead to a parallel disintegration of content-
related values, thereby inaugurating nothing less than a new «renascence» in art and 
culture history in general. After Athens, Florence, and Paris, it is now up to New York to 
play the role of the world capital of art, and it is precisely from this perspective that Re-
naissance and Renascences should be regarded as «a signpost in the difficult reorienta-
tion that our actual periodological change requires» (Kubler [1961]: 34). 
Faced with such an attempt to “update” his own theories, Panofsky responds with re-
fined ambiguity in a letter to the Director of ARTNEWS, Henry La Farge: on the one hand, 
he gives thanks for the kind words about his work, while on the other hand he immedi-
ately expresses his distress for the fact that those same kind words «seem to encourage 
contemporary artists to read my book or even to invest the outrageous sum of $ 19 in 
it… because it is really directed only to what a less well-meaning colleague has called 
“the pedants”» (Panofsky [1961a]: 6). The irony is so explicit that between the lines 
readers note the Princeton professor’s sarcastic grimace. By defining the price of Renais-
sance and Renascences «outrageous», Panofsky obviously does not belittle the value of 
his book: rather, with skilled rhetoric, he pretends to put himself in the shoes of those 
contemporary artists Kubler’s review was intended for, leading readers to think – contra 
Kubler himself – that in their eyes the book would not be worth the cost. With feigned 
modesty he includes himself among the «pedants», that is, his art history colleagues, 
thus underlining that the book was specifically and exclusively conceived for them. So, 
with few words, Panofsky formally offers his thanks for the review, but actually (and si-
byllinely) contests its basic assumption, protesting against Kubler’s attempt to extend 
the validity of his own analyses to artistic movements that had taken hold in post-World 
War II America. 
The true polemical target concealed behind what is, though expressed with gentle 
irony, a clear-cut bashing of Kubler’s thesis emerges even more clearly further on in the 
letter, as Panofsky whips off his mask and takes off the pedant disguise in order to give 
tit for tat to those artists who, in his opinion, may consider excessive or even offensive 
the money needed to buy a copy of Renaissance and Renascences: 
Conversely, I find it increasingly hard to keep up with contemporary art, particularly with the 
titles affixed to some of the objects. A signal example has appeared in the current number of 
ARTNEWS [Feb. ’61] where Mr. Barnett Newman’s composition is entitled Vir Heroicus Sub-
limus. I find myself confronted with three different interpretations of the curious form «Sub-
limus»: does Mr. Newman imply that he, as Aelfric says of God, is “above grammar”; or is it a 
misprint; or is it plain illiteracy? In the optimistic assumption that the first of these possible 
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interpretations is true, and with my best thanks… (Panofsky [1961a]: 6). 
He then signs the letter, putting his work address in plain view and singling each word 
out, «almost as if wanting to dot the i’s and cross the t’s» (Wyss [1993]: 6)1 and to 
proudly reclaim a guild-like, corporative membership: «Erwin Panofsky, The Institute for 
Advanced Study, Princeton». The German-American scholar takes cue from a simple re-
view to set the limit between his cultural milieu and that of contemporary artists, con-
sidered not only profoundly extraneous, but also frivolous and, thus, dismissible. In fact, 
it cannot be overlooked that the abstract-expressionist masterpieces Panofsky has in 
mind are simply referred to as «objects», thus bearing witness to a polemical intent and 
an undeniably negative value judgment: those works are nothing more than mere 
“things”, colour-sodden surfaces. Exactly like the canvases “painted” by Betsy, a chim-
panzee that landed on the front pages in the late 1950s for her supposed skills as an art-
ist and for the apparent resemblance between her “style” and that of some American 
Abstract artists2. In two letters both dated November 1958, Panofsky explicitly refers to 
this: in the first, he replies to the Hungarian art theorist György Kepes, who had invited 
the Princeton professor to publish an essay on «Visual Arts Today», claiming he is totally 
incompetent to speak about contemporary art (Panofsky [1958a]: 357) and affirming he 
is able to say something only on the work of Betsy, thus implicitly suggesting he finds no 
particular difference between her works and those by Abstract artists. Moreover, In the 
second letter, he writes to a young PhD student and declares, without beating around 
the bush, that «there is, in fact, no methodical possibility of distinguishing the produc-
tions of Betsy from those of, let us say, Mr. Jackson Pollock» (Panofsky [1958b]: 359)3. 
Given the above, it is not hard to imagine that a review of Renaissance and Renas-
cences in the most widespread journal among contemporary art lovers could not but irk 
the peevish Princeton professor, who as early as September 1959 had expressed to his 
friend John Canaday his own conviction of not being at all stuck in the past or «reaction-
ary» as what might seem «to the readers, editors, and advertisers of ARTNEWS» (Panof-
sky [1959]: 527). The relationship between the professor and the magazine’s staff was, 
in short, star-crossed, the kind that starts off bad and ends even worse. 
And, in fact, that is how it went. Panofsky’s letter to La Farge was not intended for 
publication, but in the end it came out (although in a slightly shortened form) in the next 
 
1
 To this day, Wyss’s booklet offers the most accurate reconstruction of the whole story. 
2
 See on this topic Janson (1959), Morris (1968), Lenain (1990). 
3
 Similar in content is Panofsky (1957). 
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journal’s issue4, maybe due to a banal oversight (as the editor of ARTNEWS Alfred Frank-
furter sustains, begging pardon for his error)5 or rather, in all likelihood, due to a well-
pondered choice. Barnett Newman himself, who represented a true intellectual authori-
ty among the abstract expressionists, promptly replied. Without a moment’s delay, the 
artist whips out his consummate skills as a polemist to defeat the adversary on his own 
ground. First of all, the sarcasm and wit, used to clarify that the Sublimus form Panofsky 
was so contrary to – incorrectly used in the caption to a picture reproducing Vir Heroicus 
Sublimis and included in an essay by Robert Rosenblum titled The Abstract Sublime 
(Rosenblum [1961]), appearing in that very same issue of ARTNEWS along with Kubler’s 
review – was clearly a banal typo: 
Had Panofsky read the article, it would have been obvious to him that it is a misprint be-
cause in Prof. Rosenblum’s article, the word is spelled as I intended it, «Sublimis». Only in 
the caption is it «Sublimus». Were I to follow the Panofskian dialectic, I could charge that he 
is above reading the text, or that he did not read, or that he cannot read. I shall not, howev-
er, stoop to the Panofskian techniques in order to hope that the third of these is true. I shall 
be generous enough to believe that he attacked me without reading the text (Newman 
[1961a]: 6). 
By resorting to the same logic as Panofsky, Newman easily ridicules the arrogant profes-
sor who did not even bother to read Rosenblum’s essay in its entirety, preferring to limit 
himself to the caption and exploiting it as a mere pretext useful only to unfoundedly at-
tack the most recent artistic practices. But there is more. Brandishing another subtle dia-
lectical weapon, typical of his proverbial erudition, Newman argues against the assump-
tion that the form sublimus is grammatically incorrect, supporting his argument with 
learned references to Accius and Cicero and demonstrating – with the help of an unique 
«prompter» (Wyss [2008])6, his friend Meyer Schapiro – that the use of this variant of 
the word could be considered as legitimate as the more common sublimis. Finally (and 
this is what interests us here the most), the letter closes with the statement that «for a 
work of art to be a work of art, it must rise above grammar and syntax – pro gloria Dei» 
(Newman [1961a]: 6). This is the theoretical crux proper: Newman blames Panofsky for 
having speciously dwelled upon a totally unessential aspect, upon a merely formal mat-
ter, without being in no way able to understand the needs and feelings that likened 
 
4
 «ARTNEWS», 60, 2, April 1961, p. 6. 
5
 See Frankfurter’s letter to Panofsky (Frankfurter [1961]: 1003) on 9 August 1961, as well as 
Panofsky’s clearly irritated reply of 18 August (Panofsky [1961b]: 1010). 
6
 In a letter dating Spring 1961, Newman thanks Schapiro for his «“sublime” help» against Panof-
sky (Newman [1992]: 218). 
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(though in very different ways) all the major exponents of American abstract art. 
The reply from Princeton arrived shortly afterwards and is rather surprising, seeing 
that Panofsky seems to take no notice of the more important issues raised by Newman. 
Instead, he prefers to keep focusing on the matter from a linguistic point of view, admit-
ting that the form sublimus does indeed exist, but it can only be referred to concrete ob-
jects or phenomena occupying an elevated position in space, but neither to abstract no-
tions nor to human beings. Even though grammatically acceptable, that form was there-
fore used in the wrong context, despite Newman’s alleged knowledge of Latin. The clos-
ing is stinging: «When I am shown a classical author using such juncturae as “homo sub-
limus”, “vir sublimus”, or “heroes sublimi”, I shall extend my apologies to the composi-
tors and proof-readers of ARTNEWS and shall be glad to think of Mr. Newman as a PIC-
TOR SUBLIMUS» (Panofsky [1961c]: 956-957)7. 
Even before being published, Panofsky’s letter reached Newman, who thus had all 
the time to come up with a new reply and include it in that same journal issue. At first, 
the artist decides to keep up with the linguistic aspects of the controversy, accusing the 
professor (now declassed to a mere «doctor») of having surreptitiously transformed 
what in the beginning had been a matter of grammar into a different problem concern-
ing style: but in this case, too, his arguments do not seem convincing, because sublimus 
could surely be called – contrary to Panofsky’s thesis – a human being as well, according 
to an elevated and archaic style. But it is clear that all this debating, which seems to ex-
cite the Princeton professor, represents for Newman a boring pastime for learned schol-
ars, only useful to attract attention away from the key point, which instead regards the 
attempt «to deny the artist’s right to create poetic language, the right of potestas au-
dendi» (Newman [1961b]: 6)]. The shift is subtle but crucial, because the discourse goes 
from a purely linguistic level to a more generically artistic one: Newman claims the right 
to «poetic license» both in using an archaic term and in disclosing new paths for the vis-
ual arts. Art has never been a question of mere grammar, and it does not have to slav-
ishly conform to pre-established vocabularies or specific rules: rather, it is poiesis, that 
is, the creation of new vocabularies and new rules that modify or even overwhelm pre-
vious canons and perspectives. 
The match comes to an end with this final move: Panofsky tried to elude the ques-
 
7
 I do not agree with Beat Wyss when he argues that Panofsky’s words were just a kind of benev-
olent appreciation of Newman’s work expressed «in a breezy tone in a bid to achieve a peacefu l 
settlement of the controversy» (Wyss [1993]: 10). Similar words are also to be found in Wyss 
(2008): 93. 
Conte, The Panofsky-Newman Controversy 
pag. 92 
© Firenze University Press • Aisthesis • 2/2015 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
tions raised by his opponent by ignoring them, attempting to focus on a merely linguistic 
problem. Instead, Newman accepts a challenge he is not interested in, waging war on 
what he considers an absolutely irrelevant aspect of the question at hand, and in the 
end takes advantage of the opportunity to stress what he is more focused on, namely 
the value and seriousness of contemporary art practices: «Yet I hope that he [i.e. Panof-
sky] is not convinced to be called “Pictor sublimis” or “sublimus” by one who has con-
sistently shown himself to be unfeeling towards any work of art since Dürer is too 
much» (Newman [1961b]: 6)]. Checkmate: Panofsky would never respond to these final, 
blunt words. 
Behind what might at first glance seem like a decidedly marginal episode in the histo-
ry of the often clashing relations between artists on the one hand and art historians and 
theorists on the other, in reality conceals a complex and delicate matter: whether or not 
iconology can be applied to “abstract” (that is, non-figurative) art. If we were to stick to 
Panofsky art-historical hermeneutics, we should say that in the case where the formal 
elements of an image do not allow any mimetically reproduced sujet (be it a mountain, 
an animal, or a human being) to be singled out, the basic level of pre-iconographic iden-
tification seems to fail, without which one cannot understand how to reach the second 
level, that of iconography, where a name is given – on the basis of one or more texts – 
to the subject portrayed, detecting the «stories and allegories» (Panofsky [1939]: 29) at 
the core of the work. However, without this second passage it is also impossible to reach 
the third and final level, that of iconological analysis, focusing on the very fact that any 
particular representation is based on principles which reveal «the basic attitude of a na-
tion, a period, a class, a religious or philosophical persuasion – qualified by one personal-
ity and condensed into one work» (Panofsky [1939]: 30). The almost total lack of any 
reference to non-representational, non-objective art within Panofsky’s published works 
seems to go in the same direction: the Mandrillo by Franz Marc, discussed in the famous 
essay On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts (Panofsky 
[1932]), remains an example of figurative art, where a monkey, some branches and 
leaves are still evident, even though only to a “learned” gaze. Vir Heroicus Sublimis is in-
stead a large-format canvas (circa 5.5 m in width x 2.5 m in height) covered in bright red 
crossed by five vertical zips, and nothing else. So who is the Vir in the title? Where is the 
hero of the painting? Sublimis is he defined on the basis of which criteria? From a strictly 
Panofskian point of view, these questions are simply senseless: the polemical corre-
spondence with Newman shows all the confusion and irritation of one looking for men 
and heroes but finding nothing except a colour furrowed by some lines. 
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And yet that Vir is indeed present, even if he remains unseen. In order to find him (or ra-
ther, to make him manifest), one needs first of all to follow a suggestion given by New-
man during his solo exhibition inaugurated on April 23, 1951 at the Betty Parsons Gallery 
in New York. On a sign hanging in the entrance to the room, visitors could read a short 
vademecum concerning the way Newman’s paintings should be observed: «There is a 
tendency to look at large pictures from a distance. The large pictures in this exhibition 
are intended to be seen from a short distance» (Newman [1992]: 178). By following 
these “instructions for use” and approaching the work step after step, we find ourselves 
before it, in its presence, so to speak, overwhelmed by an immense sea of red. While 
running the ever-more real risk of drowning in colour, we instinctively cling onto the 
zips, as if they were some kind of safety lifeboats: but these do not help either, as they 
display no regularity, no norm, no precise relationship that may provide a hold for a tot-
tering intellect faced with the absolute absence of measure. Those lines have none of 
the mathematical balance found in Mondrian, an artist who Newman repeatedly accus-
es of having reduced painting to mere geometric decoration8. 
Along with this is the fact that the large format of Vir Heroicus Sublimis (as with many 
other abstract expressionist works from those years)9 must be observed up-close to 
elude the frame intended as a margin, as a boundary keeping the reality of life clearly 
separate from the unreality of the image: the borders between the two realms blur, thus 
challenging the viewer’s ability to distinguish one from the other. By approaching – or 
daring to approach – Newman’s work, all reassuring certainties are gradually under-
mined, and what one initially thought would be a simple visit to an art gallery suddenly 
becomes indescribable disorientation. When confronted with Vir Heroicus Sublimis one 
feels like Caspar David Friedrich’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog or Monk by the Sea, 
which have become paradigmatic examples of that feeling which a long and consolidat-
ed tradition has called «sublime». Only now, we are the wanderers, the monks, and the 
sea is the painting itself: we are no longer invited to empathize with the characters por-
trayed, to walk in their shoes, because now we are in their shoes. There are no more fil-
ters, no more mediations, no more reassuring distances between us and the boundless, 
overwhelming force facing us and seemingly «about to engulf one», as Frank O’Hara said 
 
8
 See for instance Newman (1945), in particular p. 141: «The insistence of the abstract artists that 
subject matter be eliminated, that art be made pure, has served to create a result similar to that 
in Mohammedan art, which insisted on eliminating anthropomorphic shapes. Both fanaticisms, 
which strive toward an abstract purity, force the art to become a mere arabesque». 
9
 Burke considered greatness of dimensions as one of the most powerful causes of the sublime 
(Burke [1757]: 124-125). 
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in relation to the work of Newman’s friend and colleague, Jackson Pollock (O’ Hara 
[1959]: 29). 
In a famous essay titled The Sublime Is Now, Newman intentionally refers to the 
grand theorists of the sublime from the 1700s and 1800s in order to offer a unique per-
spective on that enigmatic mixed sentiment, on that paradoxical unpleasant pleasure (or 
pleasant displeasure) Kant opposed to beauty intended as an essential characteristic of 
artworks. And it is precisely this opposition that is purposeful to the theoretical project 
of abstract expressionism as an artistic movement aimed at completely denying «that 
art has any concern with the problem of beauty» (Newman [1948]: 173). Form and 
composition (precisely this latter term was used by Panofsky to define Newman’s art in 
the first letter published in ARTNEWS, what proves he had completely misunderstood the 
meaning of Vir Heroicus Sublimis) must be replaced by the formless and the measure-
less, and only these traits may allow the viewer to reach a level of engagement as never 
before. Therefore, the Vir Heroicus Sublimis is not to be found within the work, but out-
side it: he is the person who opens himself to the creation of Newman, he who “listens” 
to it, he who accepts being overwhelmed by its unfathomable boundlessness and faces 
that «spatial, emotional, and cognitive» (Bertolini [2008]: 395) disorientation which is 
the same of human existence tout court – sentiments which were certainly strongly felt 
in an America that had just left behind a world war, but which are more generally typical 
for homo duplex, for humans as rational animals constitutively poised between sensibil-
ity and reason, instinct and intellect, impulse and reflection. 
Thus, Newman’s canvas takes on a literally «enveloping and englobing» dimension 
(Bertolini (2008): 394) that transforms the mere spectator into an authentic – though in-
voluntary – actor, invited not to contemplate the work with a quiet and detached aes-
thetic attitude, but rather to become part of the work itself, losing himself in it as if in a 
new and unknown world, where he feels defenceless. Approaching that painting – how 
inappropriate and empty this word sounds by now! – is the condition required to expe-
rience its pull and even its violence, to really be in its power. The disorientation generat-
ed by the absence of any mimetic form of recognisability and of any reassuring regulari-
ty is only a first step aimed at understanding, or rather at activating the work; the sec-
ond step, complementary to the first, is what transforms a seemingly negative experi-
ence into a proper sublime experience, consisting of an oxymoronic coexistence of 
pleasure and displeasure. Meditating on this, Jean-François Lyotard claimed that Vir He-
roicus Sublimis «belongs to the Annunciations, the Epiphanies» (Lyotard [1984a]: 79) – it 
is a sort of evangelical message: 
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The message “speaks” of nothing; it emanates from no one. It is not Newman who is speak-
ing, or who is using painting to show us something. The message (the painting) is the mes-
senger; it “says”: «Here I am», in other words, «I am yours» or «Be mine». […] The message 
is the presentation, but it presents nothing; it is, that is, presence (Lyotard [1984a]: 80). 
Therefore, an authentic revelation is the manifestation of something that was not there 
before or was not at all necessary – and yet it is indeed there. This pure and simple being 
something rather than nothing makes up the epiphany, made possible by the artist’s 
creative act: the painting «is not difficult to describe, but the description is as flat as a 
paraphrase. The best gloss consists of the question: what can one say? Or of the excla-
mation “Ah”. Of surprise: “Look at that”. So many expressions of a feeling which does 
have a name in the modern aesthetic tradition (and in the work of Newman): the sub-
lime. It is feeling of “there [voilà]”» (Lyotard [1984a]: 80). This «there» is not merely the 
work intended as a physical object, but rather the event that manifests itself thanks to 
the work, the feeling that binds the viewer to the work. And that is a feeling of the hap-
pening itself, of the inexpressible presence of the event: «One would have to read The 
Sublime is Now not as The Sublime is Now but as Now the Sublime is Like This. Not else-
where, not up there or over there, not earlier or later, not once upon a time. But as 
here, now, it happens that... and it’s this painting. Here and now there is this painting, 
rather than nothing, and that’s what is sublime» (Lyotard [1984b]: 93). 
The correspondence in ARTNEWS could have offered an artist and an art historian a 
great opportunity to confront one another on this new declination of the sublime, but 
Panofsky opted to discuss the correct way a word was supposed to be written. What 
comes to mind is that, in the end, he could not have done otherwise, given the theoretic 
premises his entire hermeneutic methodology rests upon, as it is based on acknowledg-
ing and describing a sujet. And yet, if he had bothered to read Rosenblum’s article 
where that infamous caption was found, the elderly Princeton professor would have dis-
covered that a young art critic was attempting to apply iconology to non-figurative art: 
even the simple layout of that essay – which Beat Wyss (Wyss [1993]: 6) rightly com-
pared to the one in the famous Mnemosyne atlas by Aby Warburg, who exerted un-
matched influence on Panofsky’s thought (Wyss [1993]: 18) – displays the surprising 
pairing of figurative paintings taking root in the romantic tradition like Gordale Scar by 
James Ward or The Creation by John Martin with the non-figurative canvases of Clyfford 
Still, Mark Rothko, Jackson Pollock, and Barnett Newman. In short, Rosenblum was try-
ing to show how some of the main exponents of abstract expressionism referred with 
their works to classical texts devoted to the sublime – and this was iconography; but he 
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was also trying to clarify that these artists offered a new perspective on the sublime by 
focusing on the dramatic disorientation of contemporary man and the attempt to create 
his own «world view» – and this was iconology. Kubler’s review and Rosenblum’s essay 
were both heading in the same direction, as they were animated by the same basic will: 
they both attempted to clarify how an art form where, seemingly, “there is nothing to 
be seen”, actually shows the world as had never been seen (or could have been seen) 
before. 
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